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COMMENTS
REAL PROPERTY-EFFECT OF MURDER OF ONE CO-TENANT BY
ANOTHER ON THE RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP.
Husband and wife owned as joint tenants four tracts of real
estate and three bank accounts., The husband, who was later
declared insane, killed his wife, and the heirs of the deceased
brought suit to have a constructive trust declared in the real and
personal property that was jointly held. One half, they contended,
was to be held by the husband for their immediate use, while the
other half was to be held by him to his own use during his life-
time, and on his death, the title to all the property was to vest
in them. The trial judge entered a decree dismissing the com-
plaint, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed the decree of the trial court, ruling that since legal title
to all of the property had already vested in the husband, not by
the death of his wife but by the instrument creating the joint
tenancy before her death, to hold that he held as trustee would
violate the state constitutional provision against corruption of
blood or forfeiture of estate due to conviction. The argument
that public policy would not permit a construction of law that
would allow a wrongdoer to profit by his crime was rejected on
the ground that the state constitution was the declaration of
public policy of the state and that the judicial and legislative
departments must accept that declaration as final.2 In brief, then,
two principal issues were discussed in the court's opinion, i.e.,
the effect of the murderer's having a present vested interest in
the property before his felony and the applicability of the con-
stitutional provision against forfeiture due to. conviction. These
subjects will be considered in that order.
Whether one who has been instrumental in causing the death
of another may assert the same rights to property owned by the
deceased or the deceased and the killer that he would have, had
1. There always has been a controversy as to whether entireties doc-
trines had any proper application to mere personal property, which always
could be disposed of absolutely by the husband; but there can be no doubt
that in a majority of the United States they were early and consistently
applied in appropriate cases to marital co-ownership of any types of assets.
Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMPLE L. Q. 24, 25 (1951).
2. Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1950).
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the deceased died at the same time but in a different manner,
is a problem that has, in the main, been dealt with on the basis
of four different types of relationships between the parties; i.e.,
testator-devisee, ancestor-heir, tenancy by the entireties and
joint tenancy. As to the first two categories there have been
roughly three lines of decision:
1. The legal and equitable title pass to the murderer in spite
of his crime.'
2. The legal title goes to the heirs or devisees of the deceased
and not to the murderer because of the equitable principle
that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own wrong.4
3. The legal title passes to the murderer, but equity, because
of the illegality of his acquisition, will treat him as a trustee
ex maleficio and will compel him to hold the title for the
benefit of those next entitled.5
This comment, however, is concerned chiefly with the problems
raised when, in the same factual situation, the relationship of
joint tenancy or tenancy by the entireties exists between the
guilty party and the decedent. Since the two tenancies are so
closely related, they will be grouped together for discussion pur-
poses.'
3. Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ii. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914); McAllister v.
Fair, 72 Kan. 583, 84 Pac. 112 (1906); Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. 1,
136 Pac. 1111 (1913) ; In re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637
(1895); Blanks v. Jiggetts, 64 S.E.2d 809 (Va. 1951). In the two cases
where the question was whether a wife who participated in the killing of
her husband lost her dower rights thereby, it was held that she did not.
Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W. 487 (1916); Owens v. Owens,
100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 994 (1888). No cases directly on curtesy were found.
However, in Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908), the
problem was raised of construing a statute which provided that the
"widower" of a wife who dies without children or descendants should be
entitled to one half of her real and personal property. The court ruled
against allowing the heirs of a husband who had killed his childless wife
and then committed suicide to claim title to the wife's real estate through
the husband on the ground that such a construction of the statute would
violate its reason, if not its letter. Also, in a case involving an insurance
policy payable to the wife of insured if she survived him, otherwise to his
legal representatives, the husband murdered his wife, and the adminis-
trator of the husband was prevented from taking. Box v. Lanier, 112
Tenn. 393, 79 S.W. 1042 (1904).
4. Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908); Riggs v.
Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) ; In 'e Tyler's Estate, 140 Wash.
679, 250 Pac. 456 (1926).
5. Whitney v. Lott, 134 N.J. Eq. 586, 36 A.2d 888 (Ch. 1944) ; Garner v.Phillips, 229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E.2d 845 (1948).
6. A distinction has been made between joint tenancy and tenancy by the
entireties in that in the former one tenant succeeds to the share of the other,
whereas in the latter the whole estate merely continues, as before, in the sur-
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Where either of the latter tenancies is present difficulty arises
from the fact that the wrongdoer has an interest that was ex-
istent before his act in all of the property since all the tenants
have in legal contemplation but one estate in all the land.? The
courts are consequently presented with the argument that since
the guilty party, prior to the murder, had legal title to the whole
of the property, he acquired nothing by his act that he did not
already have, and therefore he did not profit by it; consequently,
the equitable rule that a person should not be allowed to profit
by his own wrong, which may be applied to the will and inheri-
tance cases, cannot be used to bar a guilty joint tenant.8 In addi-
tion, the fact that the culprit had a vested interest in all of the
property before the felony gives rise to the argument that de-
priving him of either the legal or equitable ownership of any
part of the estate would work a forfeiture of estate due to con-
viction of a felony, a penalty prohibited by the constitutional
provision.9
Prior to the principal case, only one court of last resort had
considered a similar factual situation. In Oleff v. Hodapp,10 the
Ohio Supreme Court was confronted with a case where one joint
tenant of a building and loan association account procured the
murder of the other joint tenant. The court ruled that, in the
absence of a statute depriving the wrongdoer of his right to the
account, he could not be prevented from taking it by survivorship.
The court pointed out that the guilty party had had a present,
vested interest in the whole of the account before the murder
and that this could not be taken away from him because he vio-
lated a public policy.- The Colorado Supreme Court in a very
recent case pointed out that joint tenancy in that state was lim-
vivor. Whatever other distinctions have been made between them, this one
is without substance. Phipps, supra note i, at 35, n. 33.
7. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PRorETY 196 (3rd ed., Jones, 1939).
8. Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907).
9. Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1950); Grose v. Holland,
357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948).
10. 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935).
11. In the Oleff case, the court said:
Counsel insist that Tego's [the one who procured the murder] right
should be denied him because it would be in contravention of sound
public policy and place a premium on murder. We are not subscribing
to the righteousness of Tego's legal status; but this is a court of law
and not a theological institution. ... Property cannot be taken from
an individual who is entitled to it because he violates a public policy.
Property rights are too sacred to be subjected to a danger of that
character.
Id. at 438, 195 N.E. at 841.
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ited strictly by statute, but that despite this limitation, the legis-
lature had not seen fit to place a condition on the right of the
surviving joint tenant to the whole interest in the joint tenancy
property. On this ground the court allowed the felon to keep all
the property.12 The inferior New York courts lend a lone dis-
senting voice to this otherwise unanimous opinion. They have
consistently held that the guilty joint tenant loses all property
rights in the whole of the property to the heirs or administrator
of the deceased. 13 Notwithstanding these New York rulings, it
is clear that the highest tribunals in the joint tenancy cases have
been unwilling to penalize the wrongdoer except by criminal
prosecution.
However, in the closely related tenancy by the entireties situa-
tion, the consistency of decision breaks down, and the rulings fall
into four divisions. Tennessee and Oregon have adopted the
theme predominant in the joint tenancy cases, i.e., that the sur-
vivor should get all the property in spite of his crime since, in
theory at least, he had it all along.14 The New York view that the
guilty party (or his heirs) should get nothing, and that legal title
should vest in the heirs of the deceased is followed in only that
state.1- New York is also the only jurisdiction to have considered
both of the tenancies in the same factual setting, and in both
situations the same conclusion has been reached without any
attempt at distinguishing between them. 6 In none of the New
York cases was the question of forfeiture raised, though there is
a statute in New York against forfeiture of estate due to con-
viction.17
12. Smith v. Greenburg, 218 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1950).
13. Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y. Supp. 176 (4th
Dept. 1935) ; In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 668, 212 N.Y. Supp. 116
(Surr. Ct. 1925).
14. Beddingfield v. Estill & Newmann, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907);
Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P. 2d 971 (1939).
15. Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct.
1918). But see In re Eckardt's Estate, 184 Misc. 748, 54 N.Y.S.2d 484(Surr. Ct. 1945). There the court held the rule inapplicable and permitted
a somnabulistic wife, who had killed her husband, with whom she had held
as a tenant by the entireties, to take as a survivor. The court distinguished
the other cases on the ground that here the wife committed no legal wrong,
whereas in the other cases the party causing the death was guilty of some
crime.
16. Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y. Supp. 176 (4th
Dept. 1935) (joint tenancy); In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 668, 212
N.Y. Supp. 116 (Surr. Ct. 1925) (joint tenancy); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy,
105 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (tenancy by the en-
tireties).
17. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 512.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss4/8
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Third is the line of reasoning employed by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina in Bryant v. Bryant 8 that legal title to all the
property vests in the felon but that he may enjoy beneficially only
his original interest therein, and that only for his life. As re-
gards the original interest of the decedent, the malefactor holds
that as a constructive trustee for the benefit of the heirs of the
decedent during his (the malefactor's) life. On the death of the
felon, complete legal and equitable title to all the property vests
in the heirs of the decedent. No explicit mention of the forfeiture
problem was made in this case, but the court does seem to pay
heed to it in the following statement:
It is therefore manifest that, if the deceased wife were now
living, the appellant could not be deprived of his interest in
the estate by an arbitrary judgment of the court. None the
less is he entitled to the enjoyment of such interest after her
death, but for the benefit of her heirs at law a court of equity
will interpose its protecting shield. 19
The court then went on to state that equity will impose a con-
structive trust on property when the legal title has been obtained
from another through a breach of some duty owed to him and
held in hostility to the rights of the one beneficially entitled, and
that these requisites were met here because the felon had by his
crime taken away the decedent's interest. 20
A somewhat similar ruling was made in New Jersey. There
the chancery court, in view of the fact that the murdered wife
had been older than her husband and in the natural course of
events would probably have predeceased him, held that the fee
vested in him as the survivor, but subject to a trust in favor of
the wife's heirs to the extent of the present value of her interest
in the net income of the property for her normal life expectancy.
However, the court, using the same reasoning about the relative
ages, permitted the whole of the property to pass under the hus-
band's will subject to the trust.2 1
Finally, there is the variation upon the equitable approach
developed by the Missouri courts and then adopted by the Su-
18. 193 ?N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
19. Id. at 373, 137 S.E. at 191.
20. Ibid.
21. Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 At). 517 (Ch. 1933). But
see RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 188, comment a (1934): "It is immaterial
that because of their respective ages, state of health or the like, it is prob-
able that the murderer would have been the survivor."
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preme Court of Florida. They have decided that where equitable
principles intervene, the legal fiction that each tenant had owner-
ship of the whole from the beginning is to be ignored and that
the tenants will be regarded as holding separate and equal inter-
ests. The next step in this approach is that the felon by his crime
has disqualified himself from taking as legal survivor, and ac-
cordingly is not entitled to the interest of the other tenant in the
estate by the entirety. The ground of his disqualification is, of
course, the same equitable principle that no one should be per-
mitted to profit by his own wrong.2
The question of the applicability of the constitutional pro-
visions against forfeiture of estate for conviction in cases where
either of the tenancies is involved has been considered by the
highest tribunals of only four states: Illinois (the principal case),
Oregon, Tennessee and Missouri. The first three have ruled that
to deprive the felon of any part of the property held under the
tenancy, or to make him hold any part of it as a trustee only,
would bring about a forfeiture covered by the constitutional
prohibition since his interest was vested before the felony. Thus
the felon is permitted to keep all.23 On the other hand, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court has decided that where equitable principles
enter in, the tenants will be considered as having separate inter-
ests. Under this theory, the felon never really had a vested
interest in the deceased's share and thus there is nothing on
which the constitutional provision can operate. 21 The court cited
as a basis for its so dividing up the estate in this particular
factual setting the situation where tenants by the entirety are
22. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Grose v. Holland,
357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948); Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913,
27 S.W.2d 757 (1930). In the Grose case the Missouri Supreme Court first
distinguished the two tenancies on the ground that in the case of tenancy
by the entireties there was no survivorship but only a continuation of the
estate in the survivor as it originally stood. However, the court later quoted,
apparently with approval, 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 478 (1st ed.
1935) where no such distinction is made. But this difference or lack
thereof had no effect on the court's decision. Grose v. Holland, supra.
23. Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d (872 (1950); Wenker v.
Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939); Beddingfield v. Estill & New-
mann, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907).
24. Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1943). The courts
have unanimously held that statutes barring the culprit's taking by inheri-
tance or will from the decedent are inapplicable to the joint tenancy or
tenancy by the entireties situation. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848
(Fla. 1951) ; Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939) ; Bedding-
field v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907).
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divorced and it would be unfair to give one spouse all the prop-
erty. Consequently, it is divided into halves.25
At this point it is clear that there is a definite split of authority
on this subject. Two observations can be made, however. One is
that with a court before whom the question of forfeiture has not
been raised, the chief consideration is whether the equitable prin-
ciple should override the established law relating to inheritance,
wills and the two tenancies. Once that basic policy decision has
been made, it apparently matters little which type of relationship
existed as between the culprit and the decedent. 2 The other
observation is that where either of the tenancies is concerned
and where the forfeiture problem has been brought up, it has
been the chief factor preventing the courts in the majority of
cases from reaching a result consistent with the equitable prin-
ciple.27 However, with regard to joint tenancy and tenancy by
the entireties, it would seem that the argument that the killer
cannot be prevented from taking all of the property because he
had a present, vested interest in it before his felonious act follows
a little too strictly the common law concepts and fails to recog-
nize the practical realities of the situation. It has been pointed
out that the guilty party is benefitted anew by the predecease of
the other tenant in that he is no longer required to divide the
profits and in that no longer does he have to worry about losing
his interest.2 1 This gain could be fairly gauged at one-half of
the value of the property held under the tenancy. This reasoning
25. Russell v. Russell, 122 Mo. 235, 26 S.W. 677 (1894).
26. This is shown by a comparison of cases in states that have been
confronted with more than just one of the relationships in the same factual
setting. The New York courts have ruled that the killer is not to take
under any of the relationships. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188
(1889) (will); Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y. Supp. 176
(4th Dept. 1935) (joint tenancy); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169
N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (tenancy by the entireties). The New
Jersey and North Carolina courts have taken the same position. See Whit-
ney v. Lott, 134 N.J. Eq. 586, 36 A.2d 888 (Ch. 1944) (will); Sherman v.
Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517 (Ch. 1933) (tenancy by the entire-
ties) ; Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927) (tenancy by the
entireties) ; Garner v. Phillips, 229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E.2d 845 (1948) (inheri-
tance). But see concurring opinion by Zimmerman, J. in Oleff v. Hodapp,
129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935). For similar consistency, but holding
the other way, see the principal case and Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180,
106 N.E. 785 (1914) (inheritance).
27. See note 23 supra.
28. Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948); 3 BoGERT,
TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES § 478 (1st ed. 1935).
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suggests the soundness of the Missouri and Florida decisions,29
i.e., one-half of the property should remain vested in the guilty
party and the other half should go to the heirs of the decedent.
A. E. S. SCHMID
PERSONAL PROPERTY-GIFT OF A FUR COAT REVOKED--CON-
TRACT FOR ITS SALE RESCINDED.
On April 4, 1947, donor and donee went into Saks's fur salon.
They looked over the selection of fur coats and finally found a
mink coat that donee liked. The price of the coat was $5,000.
Donor told the salesman that he wished to buy the coat for donee
but would pay no more than $4,000 for it.1 Saks rejected donor's
repeated offers of $4,000 for the coat. Donee wanted the coat
very much, and without donor's knowledge she went to Saks and
asked Saks to pretend to sell the coat to donor for $4,000, promis-
ing to pay the balance of $1,000 herself. Saks agreed and told
donor that they would sell the mink coat to him for $4,000. Donor
signed a sales slip believing that $4,000 was the full price of
the coat. He received the coat and then gave it to donee saying
that it was hers to keep. The following day donee returned to
Saks, paid the additional $1,000, and left the coat to be mono-
gramed. Later that day donor called Saks's and told them that
he had revoked the gift and would pay the $4,000 only if Saks
delivered the coat to him. At the time of the revocation donor
was unaware of any negotiations between Saks and donee and of
the fact that donee had paid $1,000 of the purchase price. A
series of suits followed. First, donee refused to accept the $1,000
reimbursement tendered by Saks, and sued Saks for the conver-
sion of the coat. Saks then filed a cross-bill against donor and
donee for the remaining $4,000 due on the coat and also a sep-
arate complaint against donor on the contract of sale between
donor and Saks. All of these actions and cross-bills were joined
in one suit.
On the basis of these facts the California Court of Appeals
found that the gift was complete, that donee should receive the
29. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Grose v. Holland,
357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948) ; Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913,
27 S.W.2d 757 (1980).
1. Earl v. Saks & Co., 226 P.2d 340 (Cal. 1951).
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